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SUNYATA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN BUDDHISM 
By-N.A. S,~tli. 
The concept of Sunyata h. one of the mdn topic, in Buddh m. 
Its early reference has bet-n found in the lvLjjhiIrunik.y<. m, F. 104 
in connection with the elucidation of Sunyata-vih"ra (~~ffifa~n). 
It is stated there that the monastery is Sunno. dHoid 01 Lltfhm s, 
cows and l-orses, etc. but not devoid, asunna of monk:. .. nd t hdr common 
characteri~tics. One dwelling in the forest may be devoid of the 
village and its men, but not devoid of t'be fore:.t exiHt:nce. In the 
same w ... y when a meditator mtditatt.,s on the e~ll tha~ one objt-ct wilhout 
its rivers and moum aim, etc. he remain!:> devoid of men, forest Or bIb, 
etc. but not devoid of the earth-oneness. Wht.,n the medhator I i!,t:s 
up to the fifth meditation concentrating l>is mind on infinite ~p .. ce, 
this much remains in his mind as a real object, asunna. Simibrly in 
his 5ubsequent higher meditations on infinite consciou; nus, on the 
state of nothingnus, akincanya, and on the state of ndthu com-doll. nu s 
nor no-consciou~ne~s his mtditation!> Ixcome dt void of t;vt',ry othe.r 
object but nOt dt,void of the, medit ... ttd obj£,cts. In his la~ \. mtdii<,;tion 
on the abst.nce of any object animittaceto-s(.tt ad};], ht., fiLdc tP.J t. Vt n 
this conct.pt is not everkbting .end pumLn(,nt .. nd thu~ he gH!:> rid of 
his three asav~s of thirst; rebirth and ignorance. Evtn lhougl> the 
meditator in this last conccnlJation is fr£edhom tht- thn;e imFurttit s, 
<lS"V •• S, he, }-.owl.ver, ret< im the ~(,na, oj his bodya'i comtituu.d of the 
:,ix org .. m up to the end of bis life. 1 hus We find eXFkint,d in tbis 
Discourse the internal voidn{,~s Sunnata <.nd the t.,XlUna 1 voidn, ~s, 
Sunnata, viz. the former is the deliver<"nct; of one's mind [rom the sdd 
impuj'itks, whert<ls the lattt.,'r is the ... b~{,nce of wmtthing ehe in a 
particukr pI. c£ Or objl.ct, e.g. mOll2.~tuy. t.,lC. It is mo~t likely that 
this internal Sunnata is conveytd in such P~ssc.gtslike: Suttcnta 8"mbhira 
Sllnnata-patlSunyutta. "Di~c( Unts ore v(,l')' detp... • and Cl ncelned 
with Sunnata, internal pUrification "S •. mYU'la. II. p. 267. 
A neW interprttc.tion of the term may be traced in S .. m. IV 
p. 54. Ananda makes a query to Buddha on the .Jneaning of the 
world empty and Buddh<.'s .. nswer is that it is empt y bec<;.u~e of the 
absence in it of the self and of anytbing of the ~elf. This new interpre-
tation is k, pt up throughout the later Pdi texIs like the Suttanip:'a < nd 
Other S.,nsk -it tt,Xts as wdl. 
A new expre5sion has been formed in S.m. I, p. I3S to convey 
the absence of soul in man in a stanza attributed to Arya Bhikdni. It 
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reads: "To conceive a perm;:',nent living being in this body is a wrong 
view coming from the god of death, Mara. For, this body is pure 
collocation of the :manifest eltmen, s, and there is not fot;!n~ a per-
manent living being, Sattva" Suddhasamkhara-punjo'yam nar' eha Sattyd 
upalabhyati/The same expression in the Theragatha, 719: Suddham 
Samkhara-samtatim /The idca that Suddha stands in lieu of Sunya has 
been suggested from the Sanskrit counterpart of the cited PaIi stanza 
found in the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya of Va subandhu , p. 466: 
. WI{: .tfilir{~)slilJ f~ ~Sif fcmlit 
. Thus the term, Sunya assumed a neW definite signifi<::ance which 
fact will be more and mOre confirmed in the subsequent citations. 
Sunyata-Samadhi is mentioned along with anirnitta and apranihft6 
in Vinaya IV.93. Digh.I1I, 219, Sam.lV, 360 • Ang.I. 299 (Lamott(l. 
Histoire, p. 47). 
The above three Samadhis occur sometimes under three Vimok. 
sas (emancipation) and sometimes under Vimoksa-mukhas,,' (channel 
of emancipation)~ Sunyata-vimoksa ( ~'Ufc(lfctql~) is when one's 
mind is completely from the three'" .impurities (Dhammapada. 
Sect.7, ver. 4). DhainIllapada has only two vlmokkhas, viz. Sunnata 
and animitta as in the Cula-Sunnata-sutta of Majjhima-nikaya. 
S. vimoksa- mukha results from the contemplation on tre non~ 
soul-conception (Compendium, p. 216,Abb. San. IX, 39) The Vimutti-
magga of Upatissa, (p. 313) also makes clear how the vOid-emacinpation 
is fulfilled through penetration into no~soul-thought. One dwelling 
on the no-soul-thought obtains Sunnata-vimokkha-mukha, says the 
Pati-sambhida (cited iri Abh. Dipa, p. 424, n.3). This specified 
import of Sunyata has been much amplified byothel: Pali authors like 
Nag<"sena arid Buddhaghosa . The former comments: "the self-character 
of all the manifest elements, the supreme voidness, i.e. absence of any 
living being and intention the extreme voidness should be made bright" 
Samkharanarri Sabhavam'pardma-Sunatam iliriha-nijjivitam accantam Sunnatam 
adij'itabbam'2 (Milinda; Bomba,y Univ. Series, p. 404) ; while the 
latter remark: Just as a wooden mill is void, i.e. free of any liVing 
being and intention (nijjivam niriham) and yet it acts as if it walks and 
1. Note it is sunya (~;lJ ) because there is no Sattva, a sentient 
being in it. . 
~. ~:~T~'" ~1Ir<t q'{q~~ fq-ilQ fifiiffflc£ I 
8{jf<Q~~ anf~fqC(iCf) 
stand,', just so is Nama-rupa, man; he is void, i.e. free from any living 
being "nd intention (nijjivam nLih,.m), yel he looh ('.s if he has a self 
and intention .;nd dhch • .rges duties. etc. (Vis. m. gga , ch. 18). 
Even ce·;t,in Mahay .. na Sutras h;:.ve favoured the idea the that 
Suny.taconcept counteracts Satkaya-drsti, belief in soul (Lz.motte, 
VimaLkL·ti, p. 148, n. 16 ,end SU'·f.ngamasam:.dhi, p. 22) as agdnst the 
S~rnadhL·,.j,.-Sutra's saying: 
"Voidness does neither arise nor die as all these things are 
devoid of their self-characters" 
"' ~~;:I'T "I'T~rij' otT " fifltff I· 
ifC{lTICI~ ~T ~fq' frcf8'r:rT: 1\ 
(ch. 7. Ver. 28 cited in B...uddh~.g,.ma-S ... ngnc.ha, p. 239). 
Let us see now wh"t N,ga juna, the gref.t ch; mr ion of the 
Suny.la tho sis ays. He maks sevual t. tl..n:.en's on difkn..nt oCC •. ions 
rend(;,ing the pl obIem r~ther my. till< d tkn clarified. HOWl Vt r it 
~hould be no ed It>.;.t he b " P,Ls.ngflc.., th •. l is a Pn.~ajy, -puisuIhin, 
viz. he would comb .. t ,t,ongly •. nd ttdicule every prop0::.ition relating 
lO any me1arhy icd (Oric rut fo,·w,j·d by his oppon{.nt. When, e.g. 
the proposition is pres<..nt( d, viz. culdn c'.w.e produces certdn r{.sult, 
he finds f,ult with <..vU'y prt of the For osition <.~king wh<..ther the 
C,.Usc Lnd the j·<..sult ,xe exL h nl 0;' non-t.xbtt.nt ;.nd conclud. s ultim .. tdy 
th . .t both the c •. usc ;.nd ,he re.uiL •. re Suny.·., void. This concludo~ 
he make, doqu .ntly in this t, nz.. :-
"This wo.ld h ;. mc:e continuii y of c •. mes ;.nd dfect: ; there 
i: no S.tlv,,; scnticr.t bdng (lxC{Ft in the (mriicalldk). 
Fa" me e void i hings come OUI of void thinbs". 
Void - Sunya - atmct1r.iyc-rcJ,ita (iI'~Ti:'r:r)~rci'f(Cf), be,'efl of the 
Self ;.nd of .. ny: hing of thf Self. (P·, • .tity.-S .. mw p,.da-hnky<., Vel'. + 
in Bulletin, TibtoJogy, G . .ngrck, Vol. V, 2, p. 16). 
The ide,. implkd here lh,.l the process of c •. uses L.nd ruult s continue~ 
for ever wir hoUl the ,id of .. ny conscious •. gent is the fundamentd topic 
of the S.Jisiamb,-Sut'.·,. NOte the C<.u~ .. tion formula Slated in the 
Sutra: 
"The ~eed whih Foducing the: prout do, ~ r.ol t l-.iLk 'I . m p-oducing 
il' ;h' proul . J 0, whil. being FoduCl d docs Lot l hkk 'I am 
p;'oduced by the ecd'; LtC." (p.4). Thus the u.tire pi'oces of cau~a­
Lion is E-ec ['om .ny consciow .• gent, cjivcn nirjivcm (r.3). ern-.p r;l 
the Thc':ag, (h.: Suddhm dh,rr.rra-Si.n uFP,dc ID Sudd}crr: SC1r.kl.alCl-
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samtatim 1 "Pure is production of things and pure is the contInuity 
of the mmifest elements" substituting an old terminology SuMba, 
pure for Sunna, void, (Adhimutta-thrra's ver. 12) and note his another 
saying : Suddham anissaram etam, "This is all pure and without an 
verlord" Ibid.9). 
We can now see that the comments on Sunnata (lI;fll'~) 
made by N<,gasena and Buddha-ghosa as noted above (p.IS) are quite 
in keeping with the traditional thinking of the early Buddhists. 
Thus the cause, efft:ct and the act of production being void, 
Nagarjuna declares : 
"What is the dependent 01 igination, 
We call it voidness" (Madh. Sastra, ch. 24, Ver.IS). 
The same idea he spells out in another context: 
"Dependent origination is nothing but voidness, and (so) 
accepted by you"-
,,: q'~:ftrtt~~"r«: ~~T iq- a- 1{OT 
Cited in Bodh-Panjika, p. 414 from his Lokatita-stava 20). 
In all these passages the original idea of nissattva, self-Iessness 
intended in the term must not be overlooked by us. So the premises 
made by the Madhpmib authors as dharmas are Sunya. void and nissva-
bhava, non-wbstmtial are quite sensible and suggestive. Although one 
may plead with Bh<,v;:eviveka (Karz-tda. p 36) thai,: these two terms are 
synonyms, they have their own primary ideas and significances. 
Some early Buddhists raise objection to such a wide application 
of Sunyata on the plea that Buddha preached it as a means to gain insight 
into no:'soul-idea, (i3Ii'JU'T). Nagarju~ replies in this celebrated stanza: 
"Sunyata bas been preached by Buddhas witb a vIew to remO· 
ving all wrong speculations. But those who resort to it as 
an ultimate end are to be declared as incorrigible fellows". 
(Madh-Sastra, XIII, S). 
The above introductory statement by Candrakirti in his Pras~na­
pada lll2.kes clear tbat it was N2garjuna who widened the application 
of Sunyata to the entire field of philosophical speculati01a. However, the 
,. ~ ~+Hr~qTct ~;a' v~r{j'6fa I 
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fact that the Sunyata-doctrine must be vkwed as a suit<..ble wez.pon "-
to check all the wrong views and opinions has also been well stre&H:d 
by Nagasena, a predecessor of N<..garjuna (See Milinda, p. 404). 
Doctrine of Sunyata (~;:lI'or) is a fundamental topic or 
'" the Satyasiddbi which adopted it as an antidote against the re,lity-notions 
of separate elements including the concepts of Usmagate, etc. Sunyata 
is not applied to prajnapti dharmas, empirical things like chariot, home, 
etc. reality of which is negated by means of studies of the scripture. 
Sunyata-concept is not an end by itself, it is aho put a stop to at the 
Nirvanic state (Ch. 141). 
The S. Siddhi employs the term Sunya along with other three 
terms with reference to the elements in this order: anitya, duhkha, 
SUl9'a .and anatman. Sunya has been made into 'selfless" in keeping 
with its early usage. Now the idea of anatman, 'selfless' becomes 
redundant; hence the term is treate.d as conv.eying the idea of non-
substantial (chs. 189, 190, 192). The Siddhi presumably implies 
thereby the theory of two-fold soullessness, nairatlTja of the 
Maha-Yanists. 
We may now try to find out whether we haveanyearly~.uthority 
employing all the four terms in parallel as in the S. Siddhi. The 
Theragatha (Talaputa's ver. 27). refers to them thus: 
O{f~'ij:;;f iiif~fu' fqq'Hf q)f~~) 
~:s:ot O{"~fa- 11'i:f q!ifff Iii( 
We have here two more characteristics, agham, sinful and vadham, 
destructive. The Thera addresses his mind to be watchful of things 
in their true characteristics in order that it may remain aloof from them. 
The mind's watchfulness over the separate personality elements 
is one of the four ways of mindfulness, Satipatthana. It is explained 
in the Nikayas as to keep. watch over the fact that dharmas like the 
removal of the hindmnce, nivarana, seven factors of Bodhi and four 
noble truth, etc. arelized and so on. But Vasubandhu gives a different 
meaning of Dharmasm riti. "The person engzged in it penetrates into the 
elements under four aspects: anitya, impermanent, duhkha, sorrowful, 
Sunya, void and anatman, selfless" (Abh. Kosa, VI. 19). This inter~ 
pretation should not be viewed as Vasubhandhu's own, but it is, in fact, 
"ased on tl:aat of the early SarvastJvadin authors as mC:NY other topics 
of the Kosa are. Cfr. the Same interpretation in the Abh. dipa with 
VItti, p. 316-17. We have the same four a:,pects ~t,-t{d in c:1wthu 
eontext. The SaTvastivc:.dins' Abhidhc:.lma, e.g. Panca-vi.Htlka, p. 10, 
insists that the comprehemion of the four Aryan truths must be effected 
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under four aspects each. The fint trud,., du}J.tj -Sny.-: h, ch n cl (J jz< d 
as anitya, duhkha, Sunyo ;:,nd anatrran. Skce DuHl:a-satya COVt nILe 
entire Ur,ivcrse (S. SiddH, eh .. 17) the ,whon 01 Euc~cJhn, n.,dc c, 
great c<Fital of such topics and proRd their £Dtological oUllcck wdl 
founded. It was prob,bly N, g' ljuna ,r,d his folIowo's Vlr.o Fkhd up 
one important aspect of the ekn:cnI5, dh,ura, i.e. SUEY, ,r,d built 
out of it a 'ctupendom pl'ilo, or hy of "veil' own (v. my F.pcr on G. ud, rada, 
BulleLin, Tibetology, Vol. VIII, I, pp. 28f1'. i.nd PujDip.r;rr-ita in my 
forthcoming Buddhist Idcalitm). 
The R;:,tnagotra prokbl y refers to Lte four Ch<J'i,C~ eli: I ics 
(lahana) of dkm1a: aniry'a, duhkha, anatnan .. r,d scntanincna (IV. 32) 
and in its comment to fot.!' a~peeU, (akc]'a) urdu nairyanila : ani/ya, 
duhkha, sUflya .. nd anatman. Though the~c four are not 'Foktn of hue 
under duhkhasatya the context irr,pliu. tha t they ae duCl ibcd as chell (lC-
teristics of things under that truth (p. 103). Foul' pcrvcnions ( fCf~f~ ) 
are~mentioncd as n:.L:,ttd to (he rhLT_orr,(n, I tlir gt: ft 10, f{ Ll'l c in, 
1;owads impnn,mcnt thing~, h;fFy-r,olion lowndt uT,LrrY tUrLs, 
~elf-notion towad~ selfle~s thir.g~ a.d ,u'Ficiow-r.olicr, l(,wljd~ Ubi} 
things. Since the nOI m body oIl Lt hi g, ,<' i: f]( (d f)( n d< 'de: F () vo-
sions, converse of them are attJibw( d fo it.( r.Oin', body, viz. nit yo-
peramita, permimnt-climLX, sukhap, kFPy-clilY..<,X, ain op, tdf-clioJ. x 
and subhaparamita, ampicious-clim<.x. 
According to V,,:si,kndtu thu e four p.rvo-tioL! ;:]( 10 bt:. 
checked by t.heir four mtidott:s (prc.tiFcksa), viz. fOUl VliT cJ n irt.ltd 
ness thus: The mindfulness on tht:. body ch(.ch tht: FUH-r<, v{ I: ier" 
Suci-viparyasa, on tbe fuJing, hifn'-rUV(l~jCn, Sdlc;->i, CT, tIt njrd, 
perTDi,nent-perversion, nit)'a-vi. ;:nd on the ~cFrLtc Fu:ordity-t!,-
ments the wul-Fervi1'~ion, 3TiC'l1 fCfql;T~ (Kot?, VI, IS with Bh;sYi, 
and Abh. Dipa, p. 316). By exerci:iLg the fom!ll oiI,c,fuhc' ,he 
said four Mpects "xe to be obscrvLdin o;du to check the '. oul-id< t" 
a perversi(n. The poet Aw'g1-.ma wt.o F(Cld(d the S~ty;.licl,c'li 
employs the terms in pcrcllel ,r,d eXF kim tt.m: 11c (l( n (r 1: are 
sunya, void bec<"me there is ncihlu' p cduc{1' ror ujO)<1 in tht:.m; 
they are anatman, (: ouHe ~) bCGW ( t 1-.( urjV{],;( i1 dt : i), ]< : f 0" (~l'rir de -
pendent (Siur,dar<', xvn, 20-21. It bcccn',u r,ow Lvic.crJ ,hi the 
S. Siddhi und Asv<'ghos<" h'.ve fi it hfull), kc F' up 1 he cali< I II;: (I.i~ ic] in 
interpreting sunya into wullets or f dflc: ; but in rc Ff ct of unctrrcn, 
the S. Siddhi m,de it into nissvaHcro, r.on-:ub;1;n'id, F],{H:n;bly 
following NL'g .. rju:ncc rnd his ,d,ool where, s A~v, g1-.0~L fut it into 
desireless. The <,bove fom' ckr. ct ni: t k! of t LirE,! i 1 ( <1,0 IH 1".1 ir;r,( d 
by Nagarjuna in his Pl'a. hrwy<" withou i cXF hirjr_g i h 11', (or. cit. F. 16). 
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A CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE YOGACARA AND THE 
MADHYAMIKA 
. The Yogacara Id~alist's maintain that the objective 'world that 
We experience is a false reflection of our mind. It is unreal because 
it does not stand our critical and logical test as Dignaga hi's proved 
(Alambana-pariksa). Itis one phase of the store-consciousness which 
is an accumulation of beotic forces from immemorical time (ay;nf~if>l" 
qr"'lf). The store-consciousness must be checked and substituted 
by a pure ultra-mundan knowledge. To do away with it is to acquire 
sommum bonum (v. ~~qr;;'lfffir~liij, M. Vibhaga, I, 5, Cffl[ Ol[11fCl~~~~ 
Trimsika, 5). 
Maitreyanatha call!:. it Sunyata, voidness on tbe ground that 
it is cleansed of all defiling forces which generate illusive appean' . nce 
of the external things as well as attachment to tpem. Voidness is not 
an absolute non-entity but something more. His plea is that the libera-
tion is secured as a result of c1eaming one's own mind of its misconcep-
tions and perversions. 1 Because our consciousness presents an 
illusive show before us, we connot deny its existence altogether. We 
deny its illusive charcters j its self-substance rem.,ins there. The 
illusive characters are gnIspcblecmd gn1.fFirg np:cts (~t6l[~Tqifi" 'fTl[ ). 
Its self-~ubstance is beyond the rezch of tbe ordinay mind, hence it 
canhardly be denied (v. m. Vibh. Tika, p. 16,10-13). 
This conception of Sunyata differmtktc E ,th m from the Madhya-
mikas. For Nagarjuna, propoundt r of the Madhy, rrcika School, Stlny, la, 
voidnessconveys the idea of non-mbsiantiz]ity (ni svathava) ,.nd ~uvcs 
as an antidote against allmisconccptionanclfalse notions. Ith<.s <:.lso been 
equated with the idea of relativity, i.e. wme contingent exist(nce of 
things. Ncgarjuna Eays: whichever is brought about by camal relations 
is not really produced, and hence non-existent. He sometime raises 
1. Cfr. Majh. III, pp. I04ff; CuJasunnata-Sutta. The purport 
of this Sutra is summed up thus: "The true solitude is not 
to be found in forest-dwelling nor in the Concentration of hert 
from all ideas, but from in attaining to the deliverence from 
asavas." • 
Malala Sekhara, Pali Proper Names, p. 904-5. 
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the co,ncept of Sy,ny.~ta to the statm of tr.e Ab: olute TrUl h, which he 
defines as free of four cattgoricd atlributtS, ens. dc. (v. M. Vrtti. 
pp. 176, 49 I & 37 S) ; but he never says that Sunyata by itself 
is the Truth. 
The Idealists do not agree with N~garjuna's line of thir.kir,g. 
Maitreya, leader of the school has pre~ented convincingly hb CL~e end 
shown how the concept of Sunyata ~hould be vk w<-d in orda to .cccm-
plish the cherished purpose. He asks: How is voidness to be vk wtcd? 
His reply is:-
When something is absent in a pkce, that pkce if, devoid 
( ~'l) of that something; what is left out there ova and .. bove 
th<it something, exists there forever. Perceiving it in this manner 
one is said to kve gTi.'.fPed voidneis in a t)'ue pnc{ptiVLI Gn:ring 
this, one is said to have penetrated deep in10 vOidne!s. This roint 
is further illu'ltrated as follow : 
Suppose, we have here some object (vastu) specifi<-d as Rupa. 
etc. When its aspect coming under category of de~ ignation does not 
at all exist as it is imposed thereon, that object is devoid of the aipcct 
that is detignatedas rupa, etc. Wkt is sem thue is the object d,signt.-
ted as rupa, etc., and what serves as the basis of the desigru.tion : this 
eupadi (l.iqrf~) (serving simply as aCCeHal'Y to H.:ch d( sigIli.tion) 
is something real. When one understands truly well the~e two: the 
basic object and the designation, he does not impo~e anything that is 
not there, does not negate the basic truth ( ~ ), neither exeggerates 
nor belittle'), neither removes nor imFoles, bUL undf;r~t<nd~ the trULh 
well; that is the Tathata (6"61) which is indhcrib •. bk in its ll<.ture: 
This is known as wen grasped voidness. 
The fact that every element is indiscrib •. ble in iu n;:.1 uJ"e is 
to be ascertained from the scripture aho. Buddha says in the Bhav ... -
Sankrantisutra : 
Whichever thing is designated with whick vU' d< dLr"t k'l'l 
( "lll"t) that (designated) thing does not at all exht in 
them : this is true law of el(ment~ (~;i6T). (v.£.S. V( r.5) 
---------~-=~~----------------~--------~----~~ 
1. The Same idea is expressed in M .. jh. III, p. 106: 
~ f( W) (J~ " ~) f6' I ij" c'~' e ::f'lq~~fa- I .' ~ 'A 6~ a{Cff~ 
~) fu I ~ mi lc{ or ~Tf(J ~r;::rrfa- 1 ~q' fq,8' ~ij'T OIT"';:~ lJtfr",~ 
i{fCfCffR'IT ~qfr~r ~CI'TQi'f6 'fICff6 I 
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D:krmata according to Kamaksila is prakrti, true characteristic 
flf all elements that remains outside of all discursive talks : 
~"f~r:ir~(C( (f(f'tt "l'rlf'I{:- P,"njika. 
How one is said to hwe ill-grasped voidness is also elucidated 
by M.itreya thus: If any ascetic or Br<..hmana does not wish to concede 
that wh..t is devoid 'of something tb.t something is non-existent md 
what is kft out there is existent, then voidness becomes ill-und<:r~tood. 
Why so? Because it is proper to say th.~t when thue is wrr;ething 
ab~ent, that something is non-existmt; wheJdn it is <:.bHnt, th •. t b"sic 
element is existent. If every thing (Le. both) is non-exi&tu.t, how 
will it be? Whz.t is it tkt is devoid? Of whc:t it is devoid? Nor 
is it proper to say that it is devoid of it;elf. Therefore the concept 
ofvoidne~s in this m~nner becomes illgrC1Fed (IEQ. IV, 161, ff, L.V. 
Pous, in: Note on Suny •. ta with c:.n extn:ct from Bodhis .. ttvL-bhurrd). 
Speaking earlier of the Nihitists (Vdnc.lfkd wr.o dmies 
absolutely ,"ny fund<.mentd hz.sic principle und( dying our talk& and 
deEign<.tions Mdt: eya ob~trv( s: We I h.ll disclol e how a Ni}jlbt· 
who challenges the very b •. sic princiFle hiddm bene,th the wrf<:.ce 
of things like rupa, etc. (matter) ~hall be fdltn frem this ~Firitual 
diScipline (dharma-vinaya). To the penon who dt:nin even the hz.sic 
principle (vastumatra) in such things it is impossible to spe<:.k of the 
basic truth and the designations. For example, the talk of the soul 
(pudgala) is posdble only in the presence of five aggreg.~tes of element s, 
matter etc. but not in their abfence. Likewhe in the presence of 
the blSic truth underlying the matter, etc. the designatic ns of such 
. things are posdb~e but not otherwise. In its absence one m"hsa bafele.ss 
talk. When there is no b;::,sic pdndple, the bafelets talk aho will 
not be there. Thus there are certdn people wl>o on account of their 
ill understanding, having heard the discourses that c.re inclin<ed to M"ha-
yanic ideas and attached to the elucid<.tion of voidness md int{ntional 
meanings, do not grasp the true .meaning of wha t is preached there, 
speculate wrongfully, and with the help of improper and ill formulated 
logiC conceive worng ideas thus: Designation is only one principal 
truth; one who conceives in this manner conceives not well. For them 
the basic principle that serves as substratum of designation is absent 
and the designation also by :no means is possible. How can there be 
the designation itself as the basic principle? In this manner they destroy 
both the principle at) well as designat ion. The basic principle being 
denied, he is to be declared as a principal Ni'toilist (Prodhana-nastika). 
As such he deserves neither conversation nor co-existence with the wise 
men. He not only dupes himself but dupes other~ too. Buddha with 
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this idea in view says: Every thing is possible for certain person of 
the soul-view, but nothing is possible for him wbo mis-conceives the 
voidness. Why so? A man. of .soul-viEw may be deluded in respe~t 
of one knowable reality (jneya): but he docs not dispute every knowable 
reality. Nor will he, due to that view, fall into unhappy state of life. 
He will neither dispute with any seeker of truth, nor will he dupe him. 
He may On the other hand, make tl>e pelson secure a true dharma. 
But a man of misconceiveCl voidness will be deluded in respect of knowable 
reality 2n~ neglect it.. Due to that he will fall into unbppy state of 
life and destroy the seeker of trutP and the end of minery. He w'll 
become finally negligent in his relIgious duties (siksapade). THs person 
negcting the truth (knowable reality) will fall from the spiritual 
discipline (dharmavinaya) (I bid.) 
Prof. Louis de Vallee Poussin thinks that the absolute NiHlist 
(Vainatika) referred to in the passage cited above is perhzps Bbavaviwka 
of the Ma.dbyamika school or the Madhyamika system itself which 
. maintains the views simihr to those expressed in the passage. It is 
most likely that the passage criticizes Nzgarjuna's school which holds 
the view that every thing ipcluding Nirvana is absolutely void. Nagarjuna, 
too warns tht voidness being iIi grasped will destroy the seeker of 
th~ truth; e.g. the ~erpent when one catches it improperly destroys 
the person (M. Sastra, XXIV. II). 
It is interesting to note that the above passage throws among 
other things a new light on the origin of the Idealistic thought is Buddhi~m. 
Maitreya makes absolutely cleer that pis school was started witb a view 
to reinterpret the concept of Sunyz.ta ( ~lfcn) which was elaborated 
in the Prajnaparamita Sutras and which was made again the subject 
matter of the MCidhyamikas£1.stra. It Was the Madhyamika who upheld 
the view that Sunyata sta.nds for an absolute negation of <lny conceivable 
thought about the ultimate truth. He never speaks of any fundamental 
principle ( 3if~gr'l ) underlying our daily experiences. The Idealist 
ch1racterizes it as sat, exist~nt whereas the Madhyamika keeps it clear 
from such characterization. For him the absolute is free of any attri-
bute, existence or non-existence. 
. It is quite logical to plead with the Idealists that then~ o~ght 
to be some ksic principle on which our illusory talk is founded. This 
point is well eluci<11.ted by Candrakirti in course of presenting· the 
Idealistic position in his Madh. Avataraas follows: 
''The rehtive existence (paratantra) ought to be upheld since 
it is considered to be the ba~is of entire chain of im'ginc-tions. The 
illusion of snake arises on the support of a rope. No such illusion 
would arise in the absence of rope. Likewise the idea of blue, etc. 
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arises on the mpFort of ~~me b,sic mind. If this bz-sic fz.ct is absent, 
wht would be (he ksis of Lhe idta of Hue, etc.? Then fore we ougth 
to uphold paratantra, the b. dc mind <.8 be dc c<,me of the blue-idea, etc. 
It is aho c~U';jng ;g< nt of defiling d( mmts <.8 well 2.S purifying ones. 
In this mznner one realizes th;:,t wh"t is <,b~ent in a place is no-nexisting 
truly. This (realiz< tion) is whLt is called truly mttring into voidnes~. 
By realizing chiswise voidnes,s becomes well conceivEd" (v. my 
S. nskrit text. p. 4-2. f.Fubl. in JOR. M. SUFFkmEnt, 19jo). 
Cnd.:··,kLte ecrlier rc.maks t bet the .dvoczJe of God holds that 
He is c;'e; tor of (he universe; likewiEe the (,dvoc;:te of (he ~(orc-com cious-
nCS~ pl;.ds 'P2,t it is tbe H,.t of oC( ds ind he.p.ce it produces thuFrermce 
of the world. But (here is one diffncr,ce bet Wet n t.hc.Ee two f,chools, 
viz, God is perm2nent for the former and the store-consciou'ness is 
impermanent for the l~tter (I bid.). 
This £'.Tgumcnt set forth by (he Idedh t!'. in L.vour of one b2.sic 
principle tallies nm;rk bly with oue prcfcn.t(d by (P.e Adv, it2 V{(hnLin. 
The universe for (he Ve~.in(in is <n iIlUfionindinToHd on (he imFer-
sonal Brahmz.n which is eterm.! ,nd ~erves 2S k~is of 2.11 illUf ions ind 
illusory tdh. The Buddhist Ideal it ts agrc c with the Adv;: ita V (: d ntin 
in so f<:r as one bz.sic realit y ( 6ff!:ll3Tif) is concnmd, but diffu from 
the kttcr in viewing it as momentay. Since the kdc storc-comcious-
nefS is moment; ry ,nd sLturaud with Eccd',CT«tin of vu1.iu rd con~e­
quences it is gradually to be ( lirrj;nc.t( d ,nd mbstitut( d fir;dly or con-
verted ir,to a perm<:ncnt ultr,n,ur.dane knowledge. 
VLsubz.ndhu'5 definition of the perf, ct kIi.owledge is tb.{ when 
the hLdc comciou:nGs, parotontra if m,de thorn of cell imFosed ideas 
(parikolps), it becomes perfect kr,owl( dge (porinisFcnno). Since the 
l",tter is evolved from the formcr, the former is comidered 2.S a real 
entity. In .Maitleya's terminology samalo Tathata ("'Il~T cr'l~n) 
is paratantra ,nd Vimala Tathata (fql1(i1T i:iIfOT) is' parinispanna or 
agdo Tathagatogarbha is paratantra ;-:nd Dharmakaya is parinispanna, 
or according to Madhyc.nta-vibhanga Abhutaparikalpa (3'{41('fqf~ifi~q) 
is paratantra c.nd Tatra Sunyata (of"!' ~lfar) is parinispanna. 
M itreya relI'.:arks tb:.t the Absolute is wmetimes conl;-:mill('.ttd 
wilb impmiti( sind &omctimts frn.dfom them. OwinglOi(scont;:,mina-
tion m",n strongly adheres to the ide£'. of subject-object relations in his 
mind ,md entertains a misgiving about the concept of Sun}'<lta, i.e. 
ideation ~ lone, cittamctrata. When he givcs up th.<.t idea <nd acquires 
the true kr.owl{dge, then the true conctpt of vojdl1e~s ~awns in his 
mind and he is said Lo be fl'ced fwm impurities. Thus the pure or • 
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impure state of mind is contingent (81'ltrm-..,-) or conditioned and 
does not affect its own nature; for it is forever shining in its nature 
(prakrtiprabbaswaran). The water or gold, e.g. is pure in its nature 
but becomes impure on account of its contamination witP impure ele-
ments. Likewise is the mind. But tpe contaminated state is some-
thing actual and not our guess. Otherwise all people would become 
at once wise and noble (M. Vibh. Tika, p. 4-2-3). Its original purity 
aho cannot be questioned; otherwi~e all our efforts for our lipiritual 
betterment would be in v".in and produce little effect. A Bodhhat tva 
takes to the spiritual path in OJ-der that he fhould Eave people and fulfil 
their dellin;s. That is the primary purpose in his life. 
Now let us note the Ratnagotra's comment on Sunye.ta. Tatpa-
gat,.dhatu is void of the accidental impurilies which are of scpar<.ble 
character, and non-void of the higpest vir(ures of inscpar~ble character 
(1. 153). There is nothing to be removed, nor is tl>ere anything to be 
imposed upon it (absolute). The absolute (~~) should be viewed 
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as such rone who views it in its true perspective gets relca~ed. In these 
statements the characteristic of Sunyata is elucidated as a middle path 
(aparyanta) since it has been denied of either imputation or f.mpmation. 
The author further denounces the Madhyamtkas and theit mode of 
tl>inking; Those whose thought is d str2.cted from the enuciated 
import of Sunyata or not composed or concentrated upon it are declared 
to be drifted from the Sunpt:>. In the absence of true comprepens on 
of sunyata of the highest import (paramartba) the undiscriminated 
absolute element (if'9;) cannot. -be comprehended or cognized 
introspectively. With this intention it is st'1.ted (by Buddha): Tatha-
gatas' comprehension of Sunyata is no other tran tnat of Tathagatagz) bha 
which is unknown or unrealized by the Sravakas and Pratyek; buddhas, 
~tc. (P. 76). The same treatite decries thOse who profGss and adhere 
to the Sunyata-concept itself are maddened in the doctrine. Buddha 
declares towards such persons: Far better is the beliefin soul (~~Ofit~ll.fl!:) 
of Sumeru mount2.in dimension thn an absessed 5unyata-coJ;l~ept 
(p.28. I. II). Nagarjune too is not less emphatic in denouncing such 
obsession: Those ~ho adhere to the Sunyata-concept by itself, we 
call them incorrigible (M. Sastra, XIII, 8). Trese two statl"ments make 
it plain that each school holds its own interpretation primaJacie correct 
and condemns other's one a fallacious. An interesting parallel to this 
i(lea ofSunyatOl. not ideal by itself can be traced in the Isopanisad, mantra2. 
Bone of contention between the Yogacara and the Madhyamika 
!chools is the question of Paratantra. The Yogacara (Vijmnavz.din) 
holdsjt as real and existing, because it serves as a basis of our designa-
tions and imputations. HoweVer Bpaviveka, a champion of Svantan-
• trika Madhyamika school refuses to accept its reality. He has also 
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criticized the interpretation of Sunyata as has heen shown in the 
above cited passage (of tl>e Yogacarabhumi: it... ~li Cf~~C[ etc. ), 
Read his Karatalaratna (Visvabhar~ti pub 1949, pp 15-~16 
51-5"9). He has been accused by CHne,se Buddhist pilgl im H~m<n 
Tsang and others that he has_ made Mahayana lacking in lahanas, 
paratantra, etc. (y. My Intro.p. XII-III, Karatala). 
For th Vijnavadin, paratantra, relative entity m"ly be unreal 
only in so far as its impose~ aspect i5 concerned "Iifl'Q6'CRu aTQq: 
but not absolutely unreal. It is an entity which consists of eigl-t 
consciousness elements (8r~r"~r;:r ~~~~ ~Cf''':) M. VibP. Tika 
I, p. 15")' 
This point has been emphasize~ in the first stenza of his tH:atife 
by Maitreya: 
There is a (foundation of) unreal imputations, but in it duality 
(of the subject-and-object-aspects) is not there. There is, 
however, Sunyata, voidness; in that voidness even there is 
imputation. (Madhyanta, I, 2). ' 
Here the foundation of imputation is the mind and mental 
states (verse 9) ~; they contihue by way of causes and conditions upto 
th€ time of Nirvana and cOVer the three spheres of existence (Madh. 
Tika, p. 12. L-IO-I I; also Trimsika, p. 41). 
Tte later schools of Buddhitm in Tibet and Mongalia which 
sprang from the Yogacara school have admitted the mind as the ultJmate 
principle and v!ewed it as sunya with the implication of advaya, non-dual. 
Nc.te, for example, Tibet's great Yogin Milarepa's statement (Le.ma Kazi 
Dawa Samdup.s translation)" I understood the Sc:mEara and Nirv"na 
to be dependent and relative states md that the Univer~al c<:u~e is mind 
which is distinct from ideas of interestendness or pHtiality. This 
universal cause, when directed along the path of Disbelief (or selfis:hJless) 
resulteth in the Samsara j while, ifit be directed along the path of Alt.rusim, 
it resulteth in Nirvana. I was perfectly convinced that the real fOur<-e 
of both Samsara and Nirvana lay in the voidness (of the Supr2.-mundzne 
Mind) '-'po 209. Previously Milarepa is .said to be well versed in the 
exposition of the science of the clrar void of mind, who'dn all forms 
and substances have their course and origin. Here the mind is viewed 
as the void which however i5 not the void of nothingness, but the pri~ 
mordial uncreated, unformed, incapable of being described in terms 
of phenomenal experience (pp. 36-7). The primordial cause is pri. 
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mordial Mind, the one unity. All pc.irs of opposites bdng but concepts 
of mundane mind - when viewed by the supra-mundweness of 
enlightenment merge in at-one-ment, and Dudity is rediu.d to be 
Illu~ion' (p.35. n. I. v. Ev •. ns wentz, Milarepa, Oxford, 1~J58). 
Note 
The term, Sunya in the following instances indicate 
the absence of people or some person :-
~TrrH Dhp. XXV, 14, Milindap. Bombay edn. p. 360 
~~lfTlf, Sam-Nikaya, IV, 192ff. 
~~Of (= '{~:) Jataka, Vol. III, No. 305. 
~li C(T~~~i{, Amarusataka, Ver. 82. 
Again let us note Vasubandhu's comments on these 
wo terms, Sunya and Anatman:- .. 
al'T~,,'hl~f'!:fC(qivr ~lf":. I 
31'Jt1=(!r!:f~qSGf iI(OfHft' 1 
'r:aolffqn'Ilil!f~f~"lc(lQ ~lf~ I 
8f'''TJ{lfitf~lQ if~tfJ{r I 
.mp f(;:fTi'ir9 ~;lf't I 
fC(tlJ{'fTt'I'T(CfrQ lI';nl'J{'f I 
Kosabhasya, p 400. 
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